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WHAT CONSTITUTES A JUDICIAL ACT FOR PURPOSES OF
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY?
INTRODUCTION

Under the established doctrine of judicial immunity,' a judge is abso-

lutely immune from a suit for damages for his judicial acts taken within
or even in excess of his jurisdiction.2 Judicial immunity is necessary for

the proper administration of justice and for the advancement of various
policies.' The two policies most often proffered by courts and commen-

tators are judicial independence4 and the need for finality in judicial pro-

ceedings.5 The public interest is substantially weakened if a judge allows
1. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1975 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 807 (1982); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 553-54 (1967); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).
The doctrine has its origin in early English common law. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
at 347; Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 534 & n., 536; Sirros v. Moore [1975] 1 Q.B. (C.A.)
118, 132, 137 (1974).
2. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) ("[J]udges of courts. . . are not
liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction. . . .") (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)); see,
e.g., Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628
F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Gregory v. Thompson,
500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974). Judicial immunity does not bar "prospective injunctive
relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity," nor does it bar an award of
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 1982
(1984).
3. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868); Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. (C.A.) 118,
132 (1974); see also Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev.
263, 271-72 (1937) (nine policy reasons suggested for "so sweeping a rule" of absolute
immunity); Sadler, Judicialand Quasi-JudicialImmunities. A Remedy Denied, 13 Melb.
U.L. Rev. 508, 524 (1982) ("Firstly, and most fundamentally, it is said that the public
interest requires an independent judiciary free from the fear of vexatious personal actions."); Note, JudicialImmunity and JudicialMisconduct: A ProposalforLimited Liability, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 549, 579-88 (1978) (nine policy reasons advanced in favor of
judicial immunity) [hereinafter cited as JudicialMisconduct]; Note, Developments in the
Law--Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 Harv. L Rev. 827, 833
(1957) ("[A]vailability of a defense to a subsequent action against him is easily rationalized as being essential to the proper administration ofjustice.") [hereinafter cited as Remedies Against the United States].
4. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1984); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 369 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872); Jennings, supra note 3, at 271;
Wilson, JudicialImmunity-To Be or Not To Be, 25 How. L.J. 809, 810 (1982); 11 Ind.
L. Rev. 489, 499 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n.4 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 856 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981), certdenied, 454 U.S. 816
(1981); Jennings, supra note 3, at 271-72 & n.34; Nagel, JudicialImmunity and Sovereignty, 6 Hastings Const. L.Q. 237, 265 (1978); Sadler, supra note 3, at 525; Judicial
Misconduct, supra note 3, at 584; Remedies Against the United States, supra note 3, at
833.
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fear of a suit to affect his decisions.6 In addition, if judicial matters are
drawn into question by frivolous and vexatious actions 7"there never will
be an end of causes: but controversies will be infinite."
The leading modem case on the doctrine is Stump v. Sparkman,' in
which the Supreme Court held that a judge will remain absolutely im-

mune from a damage suit if he acted within his jurisdiction, or even in
"excess of his jurisdiction," but not in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" 9 and the act he performed was a "judicial act."" °
The importance and necessity of the judicial immunity doctrine is well

established,11 but the extent to which the doctrine should shield judges
from suits for damages is unclear. 2 The definition of a judicial act for
purposes of the second prong of the Stump test has caused confusion
among the lower courts 3 because of its broad and ambiguous nature. 4

6. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1976 (1984) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3
L.R.-Ex. 220, 223 (1868)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir. 1974); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1283 (5th Cir.
1972); Brazier, JudicialImmunity and the Independence of the Judiciary,[1976] Pub. L.
397, 399; Jennings, supra note 3, at 271 & n.31; see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) ("For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a [judge], in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself."); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (underlying purpose ofjudicial immunity is principled and fearless decisionmaking); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
939 (1981).
7. Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 24, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306 (Star Chamber
1607); see Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1872) (mentioning the possibility of an endless cycle and the burden placed on judges compelled to answer in civil
actions for their judicial acts); Brazier, supra note 6, at 399 ("The unacceptable spectre of
a flood of groundless actions by persistent litigants is [a] powerful deterrent to subjecting
judges to civil actions."); Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the FederalCivil Rights
Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. Rev. 615, 617-19 & n.10 (1970) (judicial
immunity provides protection against "harassment of state judges" by institution of frivolous suits). But see Note, Liability of JudicialOfficers Under Section 1983, 79 Yale L.J.
322, 334 n.63 (1969) (summary judgment appropriate in case of compulsive litigant)
[hereinafter cited as Liability].
8. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
9. Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)).
10. 435 U.S. at 360.
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12. Commentators have criticized absolute judicial immunity and have urged a qualified immunity in certain instances. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 5, at 237-38, 268; Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of JudicialImpunity, 64 Va. L. Rev. 833, 833
(1978); Note, Immunity of Federaland State Judgesfrom Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 727, 727-29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Immunity of Federal and State Judges]; Note, Judges-Immunities-Judicial Act and
JurisdictionBroadly Defined, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 112, 122-23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
JudicialAct and Jurisdiction];22 How. L.J. 129, 140-41 (1979).
13. Compare Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[E]ven
advance agreements between a judge and other parties as to the outcome of a judicial
proceeding do not pierce a judge's immunity from suits for damages.") and Scott v.
Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (if clerk were a judge absolute immunity
would be assured despite assertion by appellant that defendant conspired or reached an
understanding with the clerk about the issuance of a warrant), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct, 122
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Indeed, there are both substantive problems in the test's interpretation
and procedural problems in its application. The substantive issue is that
Stump does not make clear whether certain executive, legislative, administrative, or ministerial acts taken by judges can be considered judicial
acts."5 The procedural problem involves courts' incongruous application

of the judicial act definition in a specific fact pattern: when a judge privately meets with a party prior to any judicial proceedings and agrees to
rule in favor of that party. 6 Although this conduct is a clear violation of
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 7 these "private prior agreements"

have been protected under the judicial immunity doctrine. Courts have
reached this result by applying the judicial act definition to the subse-8

quent judicial act, rather than to the specific private prior agreement.1

This Note focuses on the judicial act requirement for judicial immunity. Part I examines the controversial Stump decision and the broad
nature of the judicial act definition. Part II discusses the substantive
problems with the Stump definition and demonstrates how the definition
should be read when addressing questionable judicial acts. Part III discusses the procedural problem connected with the judicial act definition
and demonstrates how the definition should be applied when addressing
a "private prior agreement." This Note concludes that only a more precise reading of the Stump definition will aid courts in analyzing challenged judicial acts and that because private prior agreements to rule in
favor of one party are not judicial acts within the meaning of the Stump
definition, the doctrine of judicial immunity should not apply to such
cases.
(1984) with Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (proof of
prior agreement between judge and prosecutor would preclude claim of immunity because the agreement is not a judicial act) and Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th
Cir. 1980) ("We conclude that a judge's private, prior agreement to decide in favor of one
party is not a judicial act."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
14. See Nagel, supra note 5, at 241 ("[T]he scope of immunity is, in fact, broader for
judges because the method of defining the judicial function has been less restrictive.");
JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 573-74 ("The approach taken by Justice White [in
Stump] is too broad."); Judicial Act and Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 112 ("[The
Supreme Court put] forward a broad definition of judicial act.
...); Comment, Judicial Immunity: An UnqualifiedSanction of Tyranny from the Bench?, 30 U. Fla. L. Rev.
810, 819 (1978) ("Clearly, the factors established by the Court for determining the judicial nature of an act are not viable.") [hereinafter cited as JudicialImmunity].
15. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) protects every citizen from any violation of all rights,
privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution. See id. A judge's secret agreement to rule against a party, prior to any judicial proceeding, violates the right to a fair
and impartial tribunal guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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THE STUMP DEFINITION OF JUDICIAL ACT

In Stump v. Sparkman,19 the Supreme Court for the first time established what constitutes a judicial act for purposes of judicial immunity.2 0
The Court developed a two-factor test for determining whether a judge's
act is a "judicial" one.2 1 The first factor-whether the act was a function
normally performed by a judge-relates to the "nature of the act itself."22 The second factor-whether the parties dealt with the judge in
his judicial capacity-looks to the "expectations of the parties."2 3 In order to understand the broad nature of the Stump definition, it is necessary to examine the facts surrounding this controversial decision.
In Stump, a document containing a petition to have a tubal ligation
performed on a minor was presented to Judge Stump by the minor's
mother.24 She stated in the petition that her daughter was 15 years old
and somewhat retarded, although the girl had attended public school and
had been promoted with her class each year.2 5 The petition also stated
that the minor had stayed out overnight on several occasions with youths
and older men, and that as a result of this behavior and her low mentality
a tubal ligation would be in the child's best interests and would prevent
unfortunate circumstances from occurring.2 6 The judge approved and
signed the petition in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing, and without notice to either the girl or to anyone on her behalf.2 7 The operation
subsequently took place.
Two years later, and after her marriage, the girl discovered that she
had been sterilized.2" She brought a section 1983 action for damages
against the judge, claiming a deprivation of her constitutional rights.29
The Supreme Court in a five-to-three decision held that the judge was
absolutely immune from damages under the doctrine of judicial immunity.3" The Court had no difficulty classifying the action as a judicial
function: It stated that state judges are often called upon in their official
capacity to approve petitions relating to the "affairs of minors," and that
Judge Stump was "acting as a county circuit court judge."'"
The normal judicial function factor of the definition was broadly applied by the majority: Approving a petition for a tubal ligation was
equated with the routine approval of a petition relating to the affairs of a
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

435 U.S. 349 (1978).
See id. at 360.
See id. at 362.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 360.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 353 & n.2.
See id. at 364.
Id. at 362.
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minor.3 2 Thus, the act in question need not be performed often or even
at all in order to be considered a normal judicial function.33 Although
less clearly developed in Stump, the second factor-dealing with the
judge in his judicial capacity-was applied just as broadly. According to
the Court, because the mother presented the sterilization petition to the
judge and he signed it, the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial
capacity. Under this reading, a judge's approval of a mother's petition
to lock her daughter in the attic would be considered a judicial act
merely because the mother had submitted her petition to the judge in his
official capacity.3 5
Such a broad interpretation of "judicial act" demonstrates how far the
Supreme Court is willing to go in upholding the doctrine of judicial immunity, even in the face of gross unfairness in the judicial process.36
Although Stump makes clear how paramount and unyielding the policies

behind judicial immunity are, it explains neither the precise meaning of a
judicial act, nor how to apply the majority's definition to a given act.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITH THE STUMP DEFINITION OF
JUDICIAL ACT
The first factor of the Stump test indicates that a judicial act is one
normally performed by a judge, while the second factor requires that the
parties deal with the judge in his judicial capacity.37 Only in the most
obvious cases, however, will these factors present no problems. For in32. See id. at 365-67 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Rosenberg, supra note 12, at
848 (Stump Court's broad application of judicial act test, and failure to formulate a "narrow [definition] ... results in little, if any, protection against even the worst judicial
excesses."); JudicialMisconduct,supra note 3, at 573 ("Nor do judges 'normally' approve
a mother's request to have her daughter sterilized."); JudicialAct and Jurisdiction,supra
note 12, at 118-19 ("[A]pproval of a parent's decision regarding medical treatment for a
minor, is not a function normally performed by a judge."); JudicialImmunity, supra note
14, at 818 ("Court implied that a petition which would deprive a minor of a fundamental
right was no different from a petition to settle a minor's claim.") (footnote omitted); 11
Ind. L. Rev. 489, 497 (1978) ("The Court did not contend that normal judicial functions
include approval of petitions for sterilization but reasoned that consideration of a petition
relating to the affairs of a minor is the type of action a judge is normally called upon to
review in his official capacity.").
33. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 n.11 (1978) ("Even if it is assumed
that in a lifetime of judging, a judge has acted on only one petition of a particular kind,
this would not indicate that his function in entertaining and acting on it is not the kind of
function that a judge normally performs."); But see id. at 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the
act "was in no way an act 'normally performed by a judge.' Indeed, there is no reason to
believe that such an act has ever been performed ..
34. See 435 U.S. at 362.
35. See id. at 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 359 ("A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts
even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.");
Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (same) (quoting Stump, 435
U.S. at 359); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("The fact
that a judge commits 'grave procedural errors' is not sufficient to deprive a judge of absolute immunity.") (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 359).
37. See 435 U.S. at 362.
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stance, physical removal of, or assault on an individual during a judicial
proceeding cannot be considered a normal act of a judge under any circumstances, even though the parties may be dealing with the judge in his
judicial capacity. 38 The doctrine of judicial immunity was not intended
to protect this type of act.3 9 On the other hand, arraigning, convicting
and sentencing are examples of acts that are integral parts of the judicial
process and are clearly normal acts of a judge acting within his judicial
capacity."'
The problems with this two-factor test 4 develop when the act in question is not clearly a judicial function. A judge's act can be ministerial,42
administrative,4 3 executive," legislative,45 or purely judicial.4 6 As long
38. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 65 (9th Cir. 1974) ("Judge Thompson's
choice to perform an act similar to that normally performed by a sheriff or bailiff should
not result in his receiving absolute immunity for this act simply because he was a judge at
the time."); see also Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[Tihe
threat of physical abuse is clearly not a normal judicial function."), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 999 (1984); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979) (racial slander by
judge not judicial under Stump), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980).
39. The doctrine was intended to protect fearless decisionmaking in the judiciary, see
infra note 52 and accompanying text, not physical assaults on individuals.
40. See Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449
U.S. 1028 (1980); see also Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Sams's
acts as magistrate, including issuing the warrant and setting bond, are judicial acts for
which he is absolutely immune from liability."), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S.
June 4, 1985); Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The setting of
conditions for property settlements in divorce cases is clearly a normal judicial function."); Birch v. Mazander, 678 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[A]cceptance of a plea
and the appointment of counsel [are clearly] functions normally performed by a judge.");
Watson v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 611 F.2d 120, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1980) (issuing arrest
warrant and conducting hearing are clear judicial functions); McAlester v. Brown, 469
F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972) (contempt citations "[fall] squarely within the sheltered
zone" of immunity); Nickels v. Meden, 517 F. Supp. 102, 104 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("issuance of a bench warrant, finding the plaintiff in contempt of court, and having the plaintiff placed in custody" are all clear judicial acts).
41. Commentators have criticized the Stump definition of a judicial act because of its
inherent vagueness. See, e.g., Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of JudicialImmunity, 1980 Duke L.J. 879, 920 ("Courts applying [Stump] have been misled by that
decision's inadvertent redefinition of the concept of a judicial act."); Wilson, supra note 4,
at 816 ("divergent opinions of. . . Supreme Court as to the definition of 'judicial act'
illustrate the existing confusion as to the actual meaning of the term . . . ").
42. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297,
306 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Clark v. Campbell, 514 F.
Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981).
43. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 722 (1980);
Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 301 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931
(1981); Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981); see also Lynch v.
Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) ("administrative" powers delegated to Kentucky County Fiscal Court); cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976) ("At
some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an
administrator rather than as an officer of the court.").
44. See Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 188, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. June 4, 1985); see also Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 989-90 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("Maintaining order at a Board of Aldermen's meeting is normally a function
performed by an Alderman [in his executive capacity] rather than a Municipal Judge.");
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as the particular act is considered a normal function, however, it will
pass the first prong of the judicial act test.47 As a result, normal adminis-

trative and executive functions of a judicial officer have been protected

under the doctrine of judicial immunity.4" Likewise, normal ministerial

or legislative acts of a judicial officer might be considered to be judicial

acts under Stump, and therefore protected by judicial immunity.4 9
The flaw in applying this prong of the Stump test in this manner is that
a certain act performed by a judge in a given case may be a normal official function for that judge without being a judicial act.' A judicial act
Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (hiring county employees is an executive duty under Arkansas law).
45. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980)
("[P]ropounding the [State Bar] Code was not an act of adjudication but one of rulemaking."); see also Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]e need not
decide whether the members of the commissioners court enjoy absolute immunity...
for their 'legislative acts.' "), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Lynch v. Johnson, 420
F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) ("ITihe powers delegated to the Fiscal Court by the Kentucky Statutes appear to be. . . legislative. . . powers.").
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984); Scott v. Dixon, 720
F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 122 (1984); Scott v. Hayes, 719
F.2d 1562, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1983); Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir.
1982) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)); Birch v. Mazander, 678
F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1982); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234-35
(7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980). See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure to appoint sufficient number of court reporters constituted judicial act under Stump), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir.) ("supervision
of court reporters" clear judicial act under Stump), modified on other grounds 583 F.2d
779 (5th Cir. 1978); Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474, 477-79 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (termination of probation officer a judicial act under Stump).
49. That this result is less likely is evidenced by two Supreme Court cases, Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), and Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S.
719 (1980). In Ex parte Virginia, the Court made a disinction between ministerial and
judicial acts, and stated judges should not be protected for mere ministerial acts. See Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348. This Note, however, addresses ministerial acts in the
context of judicial immunity for two reasons. First, Ex parte Virginia dealt with the
criminal liability of a judge, and not a suit for damages. See id. at 340. Second, Stump
makes no reference to the Ex parte Virginia distinction. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
In Consumers Union, the Court stated that the promulgation of the Virginia Bar Code
is a legislative act, and that the judicial officers were therefore not shielded under the
doctrine of judicial immunity. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731. This Note, however, will address legislative acts ofjudicial officers in the context ofjudicial immunity for
two reasons. First, the Court did not apply the Stump test to the act in question when
addressing the judicial immunity doctrine, see Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731, and it
is clear that Stump is still the "seminal" case on judicial immunity in damage suits. See
Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 & n.15 (1984). Second, the type of civil relief
sought in Consumers Union was for declaratory and injunctive relief but not damages.
Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 726.
50. See Block, supra note 41, at 920-21; Wilson, supra note 4, at 809-10, 11 Ind. L
Rev. 489, 498 (1978); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982) (judges absolutely immune only when performing acts judicial in nature, but not for other official
acts). See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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requires the kind of discretion or judgment closely connected to the adjudication of controversies. 5 ' The purpose behind the doctrine of judicial

immunity is to assure independent judicial decisionmaking

2

Ministerial

3

acts, such as properly filing court papers, require no discretion or judgment.54 Thus, lack of immunity for such acts poses no threat to the decisionmaking process. 5 Similarly, there is no threat to the independence
of the judiciary if the doctrine is inapplicable to the performance of executive, administrative or legislative acts. Executive or administrative acts,
such as evaluating and appointing judicial officers, or hiring and firing
employees, 56 require some discretion, but not discretion that bears on
51. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980) (judicial
functions arise out of the adjudication of controversies); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d
911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) ("These [executive] functions bear little resemblance to the characteristic of the judicial process that gave rise to the recognition of absolute immunity for
judicial officers: the adjudication of controversies between adversaries."); Perkins v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 433 F.2d 1303, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
(discretionary acts taken in the adjudication of a commitment hearing are judicial acts);
Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp. 1330, 1335-36 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (judicial act requires
both the exercise of discretion and the normal elements of a judicial proceeding); Wilson,
supra note 4, at 814-15; cf Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510-11 (1978) (prosecutor's
discretionary functions intimately connected with judicial process deserve absolute immunity because of same policy reasons supporting judicial immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (same).
52. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1975-76 (1984); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967); Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d. 976, 980 (5th Cir. 1979)
(en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943, 449 U.S. 1021, afl'd on other grounds sub nom.

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir.
1974); Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also McCray
v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3-4 (4th Cir. 1972) (officials not exercising judicial discretion do
not require protection of absolute judicial immunity for fear of "burdensome and vexatious litigation"); 11 Ind. L. Rev. 489, 499 ("The primary reason given for the existence
of the judicial immunity doctrine is to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judicial decision-making function.").
53. See McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972).
54. See, e.g., Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 122 (1984); Perkins v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 433 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1970) (per curiam); 11 Ind. L. Rev. 489, 498-99 (1978). The pronouncement or
rendition of a judgment, for example, is a judicial act, while the entry thereof is merely
ministerial. See Peoples Elec. Co-op. v. Broughton, 191 Okla. 229, 232, 127 P.2d 850,
853 (1942); Abernathy v. Huston, Co., 166 Okla. 184, 188, 26 P.2d 939, 944 (1933);
Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 494, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912).
55. See Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (Because judicial immunity ensures fearless exercise of judicial discretion, "[t]he question which must be answered with regard to the extension of absolute judicial immunity. . . is whether the act
• . . is discretionary or ministerial in nature."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 122 (1984); Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("There is no immunity
when a judge acts in a ministerial phase."); Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. 713, 723
(W.D.N.C. 1983) ("There is no judicial immunity in the performance of ministerial duties."), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1984); 11 Ind. L. Rev. 489, 499 (1978) ("Since the
ministerial/judicial distinction attempts to separate acts that involve the exercise of judgment from those that allow the judge no discretion, it serves to bring the scope of protection into closer harmony with its purpose.").
56. See, e.g., Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (evaluation
and appointment of judicial officers is an executive function); Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F.
Supp. 713, 723 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (appointing magistrates constitutes ministerial as op-
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independent decisionmaking in the adjudication process." The same
reasoning applies to legislative acts, such as the promulgation of discipli-

nary rules.5

The second factor-that the judge be dealt with in his judicial capacity-might be read as excluding these other acts that literally are not
performed in any judicial capacity. 59 Some courts, however, have
granted judicial immunity for such nonjudicial acts as discharging a probation officer and appointing and supervising court reporters." This er-

roneous application results from the lack of a more precise definition of
what constitutes a judicial act for purposes of judicial immunity.6 '
In order to protect the important policies behind judicial immunity,
the Stump definition of judicial act must be read in light of Justice
White's statement in the majority opinion: "Because Judge Stump performed the type of act normally performed only by judges and because he
did so in his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, we find no merit to reposed to judicial act), affid, 734 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1984); Clark v. Campbell, 514 F.
Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (hiring and firing county employees are purely administrative and ministerial acts). It is not relevant that these lower courts may disagree
on whether various appointment duties are either executive, administrative or even ministerial, because both the courts and commentators agree that these actions are not judicial.
See Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982); Lewis v. Blackburn, 555
F. Supp. 713, 723 (.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1984); Clark v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 (,.D. Ark. 1981); Block, supra note 41, at 917-18;
Wilson, supra note 4, at 815.
57. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Richardson v. Koshiba,
693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982); McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3-4 (4th Cir. 1972);
Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Doe v. County of Lake,
399 F. Supp. 553, 556 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Wilson, supra note 4, at 814-15.
58. The Supreme Court has stated that the Virginia Court in propounding the State
Bar Code acted in a rulemaking, not an adjudicatory, capacity; judicial immunity was
therefore irrelevant. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731
(1980). Thus, legislative acts cannot be protected under the doctrine of judicial immunity. See id.; Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970).
59. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. Although these acts may be official
acts, they must be distinguished from judicial acts. See Cronovich v. Dunn, 573 F. Supp.
1330, 1336 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (an "official" function of ajudge may be executive, legislative or judicial in nature); Block, supra note 200, at 920-21 (Stump Court disregards need
to distinguish judicial acts from administrative or legislative acts; the broad judicial act
definition equates judicial capacity with official capacity).
60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 41. To examine diverging results under the Stump judicial act
definition, compare supra note 48 and accompanying text with supra note 56 and accompanying text. One explanation for these inconsistencies is that the "appointment" of
court reporters, clearly an administrative act, is equated with the "supervision" of court
reporters. See Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1980) (judge immune for
failure to appoint sufficient number of court reporters) (citing Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d
1256, 1263-64 (5th Cir.) (supervision of court reporters clear judicial function), modified
on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978)), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
Although both actions are administrative in nature, the supervision of court reporters has
a stronger connection with the judicial function. A judge can order the reporter to prepare a statement of facts for a case, see Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 305, or order him to alter or
change a transcript, see Slavin, 574 F.2d at 1263-64, thus playing a role in the adjudicative process.

1512

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

spondents' argument that. . . his
action [was] nonjudicial and deprived
62
him of his absolute immunity."
The first factor should therefore be read as meaning a function normally performed by judges only and not by administators or executives
or legislators. A judge who hires city employees or sits on a county fiscal
court with legislative powers only or evaluates candidates for judicial office may be performing a normal function, but it is not one normally
performed only by a judge.6 3 Policy reasons favoring absolute immunity
do not apply under these circumstances. Liability arising from these actions can hardly cause fear in the judicial decisionmaking process.'
Moreover, these actions do not stem from any case or controversy, and
thus can have no effect on the finality of judicial proceedings.6 5
That the second factor-"judicial capacity"-is a narrower concept
than "official capacity" is supported by Lynch v. Johnson,6 6 to which the
Stump majority referred in addressing the second factor.6 7 The court
noted in Lynch that although the defense of judicial immunity is very
broad, "it does not afford any protection to a judge acting. . . in nonjudicial activities." 6 Thus, the county judge could not invoke the doctrine of judicial immunity "because his service on a [county fiscal court]
with only legislative and administrative powers did not constitute a judicial act."6 9 Although these actions may be official functions of the judge,
they are not judicial acts warranting immunity.7 0 Under this factor it is
62. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1978) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (candidate
evaluation not judicial in nature); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970)
(fiscal court with only legislative and administrative duties not judicial in nature); Clark
v. Campbell, 514 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-03 (W.D. Ark. 1981) ("hiring and firing" of employees by county judge administrative rather than judicial act); see also Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F. Supp. 713, 723 (W.D.N.C. 1983) ("Appointment. . . is a power to select
that. . . is vested variously in governors, district bar organizations, judges, local governing boards, local officials, and the electorate.") (emphasis in original), affd, 734 F.2d
1000 (4th Cir. 1984).
64. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text.
66. 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970).
67. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 n.10 (1978).
68. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970).
69. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 n.10 (1978).
70. See Block, supra note 41, at 920-21 (Stump Court disregards need to distinguish
judicial acts from administrative or legislative acts; broad judicial act definition equates
judicial capacity with official capacity). In McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.
1972), the Fifth Circuit applied four factors to analyze the judicial act in question. See id.
at 1282. The fourth factor states that "the confrontation arose directly and immediately
out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity." Id. The Stump Court created the
judicial/official confusion by using the words "official capacity" when applying the first
factor of the judicial act definition. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 ("State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are called upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors. . . .") (emphasis added). Adding to the confusion
over the nature of a judicial act, some courts have reverted back to the McAlester fourpart test instead of applying the Stump two-prong test. See, e.g., Thomas v. Sams, 734
F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. June 4, 1985); Am-
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important to look to the character of the act, not the character of the
actor.7 1 Indeed, Stump states as the first factor the "nature of the act
itself."72 Thus, if, for example, a court clerk exercises discretion in the
course of a judicial7 3proceeding, he may be able to invoke the doctrine of
judicial immunity.
In short, the doctrine of judicial immunity is meant to protect only
judicial acts,7 4 which, by definition, are acts requiring judicial discretion.7 5 When a judge does not exercise judicial discretion,7 6 the policies
supporting absolute immunity disappear.7 " A ministerial act requires no
discretion,7" and while administrative, legislative, or executive acts require varying degrees of discretion, it is not judicial discretion merely
because the actor is a judge. 9 Judicial immunity should therefore not be
granted to such exercises of discretion.
mons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1447 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 999 (1984);
Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396-97 (5th Cir. 1982).
71. See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879); Lewis v. Blackburn, 555 F. Supp.
713, 723 (W.D.N.C. 1983), afid, 734 F.2d 1000 (4th Cir. 1984); Clark v. Campbell, 514
F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (W.D. Ark. 1981); Doe v. County of Lake, 399 F. Supp. 553, 556
(N.D. Ind. 1975).
72. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
73. See Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) ('The question which
must be answered with regard to the extension of absolute judicial immunity . . . is
whether the act performed by the [clerk] is discretionary or ministerial in nature."), cert.
denied, 105 S. CL 122 (1984); McCray v. State, 456 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1972) (court clerk
act of filing papers mere ministerial act and thus no absolute judicial immunity); Gutierrez v. Vergari, 499 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no absolute judicial immunity for court clerk's ministerial duties). Court clerks are also immune from damages,
however, for actions they are specifically required to do under court order or at judges'
discretion. See Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (absolute judicial
immunity for court clerks following direct court order or specific command of judge);
Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) ("A clerk 'may receive
immunity in his own right for the performance of a discretionary act or he may be covered by the immunity afforded the judge because he is performing a ministerial function
at the direction of the judge.' ") (quoting Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 (3rd Cir.
1975)). Thus, if a judge orders a clerk to perform a ministerial task that causes injury to
an individual, immunity may result for both the judge and the clerk in jurisdictions that
interpret the supervision of court reporters as a judicial act. See Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d
1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (absolute judicial immunity for clerks following direct court
order or specific command of judge); Blackwell v. Cook, 570 F. Supp. 474, 478-79 (N.D.
Ind. 1983) (supervision of court clerks or reporters judicial function) (citing Rheuark v.
Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 305 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981)).
74. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 365 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 348, 349, 351, 354, 357 (1872)); Brewer v.
Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304-05 (5th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234-35
(7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980).
75. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE STUMP DEFINITION OF A
JUDICIAL ACT

Even when the Stump definition of judicial act is not being interpreted
too broadly because of its inherent structural problems, it is being applied
incorrectly."0 This misapplication takes place in cases involving a "private prior agreement," which involves a judge privately agreeing, prior to
the judicial proceeding, to rule in favor of a party on a particular matter.8 1 Courts disagree over whether the specific private prior agreement
by the judge can be considered to be a judicial act within the meaning of
the Stump definition."2
A private prior agreement to rule in favor of a party is a violation of
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits "the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution," and
holds liable any person in violation thereof.8 3 Nevertheless, the Eleventh
Circuit has applied the doctrine of judicial immunity to hold a judge to
80. The Stump judicial act definition has received substantial criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Judicial Immunity, supra note 14, at 819 (Stump factors criticized);
JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 575 (Court's broad definition ofjudicial act empow-

ers judges to impose "extreme and irreversible remedies"); JudicialAct and Jurisdiction,
supra note 12, at 119-20 (broad and generous judicial act definition offers no clear guides
to its application); 22 How. L.J. 129, 141 (1979) ("Stump will undoubtedly result in very
serious and unfortunate consequences").
81. See Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1494-95 (11 th Cir. 1984); Beard v. Udall,
648 F.2d 1264, 1269 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d
844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); see also Scott v. Dixon, 720
F.2d 1542, 1546-47 (1lth Cir. 1983) (court clerk performing judicial function reached
agreement with a party to issue a criminal arrest warrant), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 122
(1984).
82. Compare Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e...
hold that even advance agreements between a judge and other parties as to the outcome
of a judicial proceeding do not pierce a judge's immunity from suits for damages.") with
Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (a private prior agreement to rule in favor of one party not a judicial act) and Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d
844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id. Although § 1983 uses the sweeping language of "every person," the settled common
law doctrine of judicial immunity was not abolished. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 55455 (1967); see Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1974 (1984) ("[C]ommon-law principles
of.

.

.judicial immunity [are] incorporated into our judicial system and.

. . should

not

be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.") (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) ("[The] doctrine of judicial immunity [is]
applicable in suits under § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the
legislative record [gives] no indication that Congress intended to abolish this long-established principle."); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) ("A seemingly
impregnable fortress in American Jurisprudence is the absolute immunity of judges from
civil liability for acts done by them within their judicial jurisdiction.").
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be absolutely immune from suit under section 1983.11 The court did not

apply the Stump two-factor test to the illegal agreement, 85 but instead

implicitly applied the test to the subsequent ruling by the judge in the
judicial proceeding.8 6
If the Stump definition is properly applied to the private prior agreement, it will fail the test convincingly." Such an act cannot be consid-

ered a normal function of a judge even under the most expansive reading

of the first factor.8 8 An illegal agreement by a corrupt judge prior to any
judicial proceedings does not resemble anything close to a normal judicial function. 9 Moreover, some courts hold that a judge who acts with
84. See Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11 th Cir. 1984).
85. See id. at 1494-95.
86. The Dykes court followed the reasoning of Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 122 (1984) and Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981). See Dykes, 743 F.2d at 1495. In Scott, it was
asserted that a court clerk reached an agreement with the defendant to issue a warrant for
plaintiff's arrest. See Scott, 720 F.2d at 1544. The court clerk issued the arrest warrant to
enable the defendant to collect a debt, and was found to be immune under the doctrine of
judicial immunity. See id. at 1547. The court stated that "[i]f [the clerk] were a judge,
his absolute immunity would be assured despite the assertion. . . that [the defendant]
and [the clerk] reached an understanding about the issuance of a warrant to be used [to
collect a debt]." Id. at 1546. The Scott court, however, applied the Stump test not to the
prior understanding, but to the issuance of a warrant, a clear judicial act. See id. at 1547.
In Harper,the court noted in dictum "that even a judge who is approached as a judge
by a party for the purpose of conspiring to violate § 1983 is properly immune from a
damage suit." Harper,638 F.2d at 856 n.9. The Harpercourt relied on Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24 (1980), see Harper, 638 F.2d at 856 n.9, in which a judge issued an illegal
injunction resulting from a conspiracy with a private party. See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 26.
The Supreme Court in Dennis granted certiorari on the issue of derivative immunity, see
445 U.S. 942 (1980), but denied certiorari on the issue ofjudicial immunity, see id. at 943.
The Court stated in dictum, "[t]he courts below concluded that the judicial immunity
doctrine required dismissal of the § 1983 action against the judge who issued the challenged injunction, and as the case comes to us, the judge has been properly dismissed
from the suit on immunity grounds." Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27.
The Court's dictum in Dennis, however, resembles the faulty reasoning of the Scott
court, because the Court only addressed the judicial act of issuing the illegal injunction,
but not any prior understanding to commit the act. Id. Moreover, the facts of the case
are distinguishable from a private prior agreement pattern because the alleged conspiracy
in Dennis to rule in favor of one party took place after the judicial proceeding had already
begun. See Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 588 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir.) ("Under the
alleged conspiracy, [defendant] bestowed financial favors upon [the judge], who in return
would rule as [defendant] directed in cases before his court.") (emphasis added), modified
on othergrounds, 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert denied, 445 U.S. 943, 449
U.S. 1021, afld on other grounds sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
87. See Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Rankin v.
Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847-49 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); see also
Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1982) (because no material issues
of fact raised as to an improper prior agreement, judge immune under Stump test).
88. Although the Stump Court applied the first factor very broadly, see supra note 32
and accompanying text, it did at least apply the test to the "type of act normally performed only by judges," see Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. A private prior agreement, no matter how broadly interpreted, is still an illegal act that takes place before the judicial
process ever begins. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89. The court in Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
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any personal prejudice or economic interest in a case is not acting judicially, and should be held liable for any resulting damages.9 0
Thus, the true issue underlying the faulty procedural application of

Stump is whether a private prior agreement-a clear nonjudicial actcan be separated from the ruling itself-a clear judicial function. Some

courts contend that if a judicial officer commits both judicial and nonjudicial acts, he can be held liable for those damages caused by his nonjudicial conduct. 9 ' Therefore, application of the judicial act definition must
focus on the act that is deemed to be the proximate cause of any deprivation of federally protected rights.9" In a private prior agreement, the act
is a judge's secret conspiracy with a party prior to any judicial proceedimmunity by looking.9 3 The Stump test requires the court to determine
94
ing at the act, not its end result, the proceeding.
The strongest reasons for not separating the two acts, and thus for the
faulty procedural application of Stump, lie in the policies behind judicial
immunity.95 An argument has been made that to hold judges liable for

damages in such cases will encourage suits against judges, 96 which may
U.S. 939 (1981), called the act "the antithesis of the 'principled and fearless decisionmaking' that judicial immunity exists to protect." Id. at 847 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). See supra note 40 and accompanying text for normal judicial
functions.
90. See, e.g., Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 397 (5th Cir. 1982) (judge vindicating personal objectives not acting judicially); Birch v. Mazander, 678 F.2d 754, 756 (8th
Cir. 1982) (no indication that judge had any "personal involvement" with appellant to
deprive him of his immunity); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th Cir.) ("[W]hcn
...a judge has acted out of personal motivation and has used his judicial office as an
offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives, . . . then the judge's actions do not
amount to 'judicial acts.' "), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d
330, 336 (7th Cir. 1979) (judge could be held liable for nonjudicial "racially motivated"
critical communications to the press), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980); Zarcone v. Perry,
572 F.2d 52, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1978) (judge's outrageous conduct causing coffee vendor to be
handcuffed, humiliated and treated for medical care because of judge's distaste of coffee
resulted in punitive as well as compensatory damages).
91. See, e.g., Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 n.9 (6th Cir. 1984); Brewer v.
Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235
(7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980). But see Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d
1488, 1501-02 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) (Hill, J., dissenting) ("It is improper and overly formalistic to separate a judge's prior agreement to decide in favor of one party from the
specific act of ruling on the case itself. . . because that separates the rationale behind the
decision from the decision itself.").
92. See Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Rankin v.
Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847-48 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
93. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Indeed, the Stump Court looked at the petition to
determine if a judicial act was performed; it did not look to the end result of the petition,
the tubal ligation. See id.
95. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
96. See Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1984) (Hill, J., dissenting); see also Brazier, supra note 6, at 399 ("The unacceptable spectre of a flood of
groundless actions by persistent litigants is [a] powerful deterrent to subjecting judges to
civil actions."); Kates, supra note 7, at 617-19 & n.10 (judicial immunity protects against
the "harassment of state judges" by frivolous suits).
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deter qualified candidates from seeking judicial office. 97 Furthermore,
judges could be haled into court and questioned about their actions,
based only on conclusory allegations of prior agreements and conspiracies. 98 Such frivolous claims conflict with the important policies underlying judicial immunity: judicial independence and finality.9 9
These policies, however, must be balanced against the fundamental
policy of providing an adequate remedy to a wrongfully injured party."
Furthermore, firm application of the summary judgment rule of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56111 would require the prior agreements to be
supported by allegations of fact, thus substantially reducing the number

of frivolous suits." 2 In addition, holding corrupt judges liable for dam-

ages is likely to deter similar lawless conduct and thus uphold judicial
integrity,10 3 which might encourage qualified judicial candidates." °
Thus, the arguments against separating the private prior agreement from
the decision are not persuasive.
Finally, there is analagous authority to support the separation of the
private prior agreement from the actual decision. A legislator who re-

ceives a bribe in exchange for his vote can be criminally prosecuted for
the bribe alone without any inquiry into the legislative act itself, which is

protected by legislative immunity.105 The notion is that although the illegal bribe and the actual vote are closely connected, the bribe undermines
97. Although preventing the deterrence of qualified candidates has been advanced as
a policy for granting judicial immunity, see Feldthusen, JudicialImmunity: In Search of
an AppropriateLimiting Formula, 29 U.N.B. L.J. 73, 77 (1980); Jennings, supra note 3, at
271; JudicialAct and Jurisdiction,supra note 12, at 116 n.21, it has also been criticized as
unfounded, because other professions subject practitioners to broader liability than
judges, and this has not prevented people of integrity and honesty from pursuing such
careers, see Sadler, supra note 3, at 528; JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 581-82.
98. See Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1502 (11th Cir. 1984) (Hill, J., dissenting). But see Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc) ("[M ere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material
facts, survive a motion to dismiss.
), cert denied, 445 U.S. 943, 449 U.S. 1021, affd
on other grounds sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).

99. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478-79 (5th Cir. 1985) (broad, indefinite,
conclusory complaints lay groundwork for disruption of judge's duties and frustration of
policies underlying judicial immunity). See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
100. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 63-64 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1974); Feldthusen,
supra note 97, at 106-07; Sadler, supra note 3, at 525-26; JudicialImmunity, supra note
14, at 819; Immunity of Federaland State Judges, supra note 12, at 741 & n.88.
101. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
102. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978); Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d
1022, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1982); Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam); Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 846 n.61; Liability, supra note 7, at 330, see
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 & n.35 (1982) (reiterating admonition in
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978), against insubstantial suits against public
officials enjoying qualified immunity; such cases should be disposed of by summary judgment motion).
103. See Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 836; JudicialImmunity, supra note 14, at 819 &
n.74; JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 581-82 & n.273.
104. See JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 581-82 & n.273.

105. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524-25 (1972).
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the integrity of the legislative process.106
Similarly, a prior private agreement undermines the integrity of the

judiciary.1 o7 The act of ruling in favor of one party is obviously closely

connected with the prior agreement or conspiracy to do so. The private
prior agreement does not pass muster under the Stump judicial act defini-

tion, however, and therefore the doctrine ofjudicial immunity should not
apply.' 018 This illegal conduct necessarily erodes the integrity and proper
administration of the justice system. Thus, there are compelling reasons

to hold a corrupt judge liable in damages for harm he causes an individual. If the doctrine of judicial immunity is misapplied in such cases, im-

proper and unethical acts will be treated like proper judicial acts and will
therefore become part of our judicial system.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of judicial immunity is broad. It is a necessity for a
strong and independent judiciary. Although the parameters of judicial

immunity are extensive, they do have limits. The judicial act requirement of judicial immunity is a basic tenet of the doctrine. If there is no
judicial act performed, absolute immunity does not apply. A private
prior agreement to rule in favor of a party is not a judicial act under any
definition of the term, and therefore should never be afforded judicial
immunity protection. Although executive, administrative, legislative, or

ministerial acts may be official functions of a judge, they are not judicial
acts under a correct reading of the Stump definition. Thus, the doctrine
of judicial immunity should not apply in these instances either.
Joseph Romagnoli
106. See id. at 524-25; Nagel, supra note 5, at 242-43 & n.36.
107. See Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) ("It is the antithesis of
the 'principled and fearless decision-making' that judicial immunity exists to protect.")
(quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); see
also Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1488, 1495 (1Ilth Cir. 1984) (although not following
Rankin, majority cites Rankin argument against prior private agreements as both "persuasive" and "well-reasoned"); JudicialMisconduct, supra note 3, at 557, 589 & n.336
(four justices of Oklahoma Supreme Court sold approximately 1878 cases between 1937
and 1958; "[t]he many corrupt decisions rendered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court...
demonstrate the threat to the integrity of the judicial system posed by unbridled judges").
At least one commentator has analogized the possible restriction of judicial immunity
with present limitations on legislative immunity. See Nagel, supra note 5, at 242-43 &
n.37 (analogy suggests that a judicial order or judgment would be as immune as a legislative vote, but liability might flow from judge's procedures, such as flipping a coin or
taking a bribe to decide case).
108. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.

